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If( THE

SOUTHLAND CORP., et al.

~ to S. Ct. Cal.

"

(Bird [C.J.], Grodin, Newman,
Reynoso; Mosk, Richardson [diss.])

v.
~ KEATING,

MEMORANDUM~ ~ ~
Cd sjc:..i::- ~~

et al.

State/Civil

Timely (wjext'n)

~~~~d;t
~~~l..A/VtA.~~~

1.

SUMMARY:

by a state court of class

----

action procedures on arbitrations covered by the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA") violates the Supremacy Clause; whether a state statute,
permitting litigation of certain claims made arbitrable by a contract
covered by the FAA, violates the Supremacy Clause.
circumstances of this case, there is an appealable
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!?/(

-

Whether, under the
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2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

Southland Corporation is

the owner of the service trademark "7-Eleven," and franchises 7-Eleven
convenience stores.

Southland's standard 7-Eleven franchise agreement

provides each franchisee with license to use certain trademarks, a
lease or sublease of certain stores, the financing of store
inventories, and advertising and merchandizing assistance.

The

franchisees in return operate the stores and provide Southland with a
percentage of gross profits.

Each agreement contains an arbitration

clause providing that:

"[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to
this Agreement or the breach thereof shall be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American
Arbitration Association •.• and judgment upon any award
rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any court
having jurisdiction thereof." J.S. App. 3a.
Between 1975 and 1977, several franchisees--appees here--filed
individual actions against Southland in state court alleging among
other things fraud, oral misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach
of fiduciary duty, and violation of the disclosure requirements of the
Franchise Investment Law, Cal. Corp. Code §31000 et seq.

Southland

filed an answer including the defense of failure to arbitrate.

-

1977, another

-------------- franchisee--also an appee here--filed a class

In

action

against Southland on behalf of an asserted class of approximately 800
Southland franchisees in California, asserting claims similar to those
in the other actions.
all pending cases.

Southland ~etitioned

to compel arbitration in

Shortly thereafter, all the cases were

consolidated.
Except for the claims based on the Franchise Investment Law, the

-

3 -

TC granted Southland's motions to compel arbitration.

Southland

appealed from the order insofar as it excluded the claims based on the
California statute.

The franchisees appealed from the order insofar

as it compelled arbitration of the rest of their claims.

The

franchisees also objected to the TC's failure to rule on the class
certification motion before ordering arbitration.
3.

DECISION BELOW:

At the outset,

the~l.

S. Ct. observed that

the contracts at issue involve interstate commerce and thus fall
within the ambit of thev;ederal Arbitration Act, 9
seq.

u.s.c.

§§

1, et

Section 2 of the Act, central to the dispute here, provides:

"A written provision in any maritime transaction or a
A .~
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
~
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
~ Lof such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform ~
the whole ~r any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."
A

Appees contended that the contracts were void as contracts of

/1 adhesion.

•

The Cal.

s. Ct. agreed that the contracts were adhesive .
~

But one of two further factors are required to render a contract of
adhesion unenforceable under California law: that the challenged
provision does not fall within the reasonable expectations of the
weaker

party~

or that--even if within the weaker party's expectation--

the provision is unduly oppressive.
in the context of contracts

~f

The court stated that arbitration

adhesion is problematic, because

susceptible of being structured or used to unfair advantage.
~

But

arbitration can be a good thing, speeding resolution of disputes at

,
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less cost to the adversaries.
is not oppressive.

For that reason, an arbitration clause

Further, arbitration clearly was within the

contemplation of the franchisees.
clauses were valid and

-The

-

Thus, in general,

en~orc~

under state law.

s

~~# ' l

-

~~~

court turned to the ~ ranchise Investment Law . claims, 1 lairns

that Southland willfully made false

required statements of fact.

One

s~~e.;~n~~~iled

pro~sion

to make

of the state statute

states that "Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to

1

bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any
provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void."
state supreme court found that t his

The

alleged violations of the statute, which required a judicial forum.
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Wilko v.
346

u.s.

427 (1953).

~

provi~ion barred arbitration of ~
~

Swan, ~

In Wilko, this Court held that similar language

in section 14 of the Securities

~ct

of 1933 (15

u.s.c.

§77n) permits

suit by a customer against a brokerage firm for alleged
misrepresentation in sale of securities, notwithstanding a provision
for arbitration contained in the agreement.

The arbitration clause

was a "stipulation" and the right to select the judicial forum in
which to bring the claim the kind of "provision" that could not be
waived in advance.

The effectiveness of the securities statute would

be lessened by requiring arbitration, in part because of the limited
nature of judicial review.

Thus the Court concluded, "Congress must

have intended [the waiver provision] to apply to waiver of judicial
trial and review."

346

u.s.,

at 437.

The California legislature

modeled the Franchise Investment Law on the Securities Act.
_/

the same purposes--protecting investors through preinvestment

They have

- 5 disclosure--and their operative provisions often employ the same
language.

Thus, the California legislature intended, as Congress did

in the Securities Act, that the nonwaiver provision prevent compelled
arbitration of claims made under the Law.
The next question was whether the Federal Arbitration
pr~d the Law, so construed.

~ct ~

JY -

Appnts argued that the FAA, in ~

mandating that an arbitration provision be "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable," establishes a general principle of arbitrability that
preempts any state law or policy restrictive of arbitration.
court termed this position "overly broad."
Conklin, 388

u.s.

The

In Prima Paint v. Flood &

395 (1967}, this Court held that a claim of fraud in

the inducement of the contract (as distinguished from a claim of fraud
in the inducement of the arbitrability clause} is a question for the
arbitrator, not the court, and that this rule applies whatever the
rule under state law.

But Prima Paint dealt exclusively with the rule

to be applied by federal courts sitting in diversity.

It left open

the question whether the FAA applies to state courts at all.

Since

that time, however, virtually every court has concluded that the

FA~

creates "substantive federal law" that must be applied, regardless of
forum, wherever federal jurisdiction exists (and by this is meant
wherever a contract is in interstate commerce} •

The question was thus

whether the FAA's substantive law--requiring that arbitration clauses
be enforced--precludes a State from providing unwaivable access to
court for franchise investors.

The California court recognized that

some courts had answered that question in the affirmative.
Medicab Intern., Inc., 597 P.2d 380, 383 (Wash.
~

1979}~

Allison v.

Barron v.

Tastee Freez Intern., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 1213 (E.D. Wis. 1980}.

But

- 6 -

the court "respectfully disagree[d]."

J.S. App. 15a.

The coutr granted hat the FAA generally requires that interstate
contracts should be free from judicial hostility to arbitration.
this spirit can be harmonized with the California law.
encourages arbitration as a matter of state policy.

But

California too

But California

has a countervailing policy that recognizes that in some circumstances
the public interest is best served by guaranteeing access to a
judicial forum.

Congress has not sought to preempt the field of

regulating franchise relationships.

So there is no reason to believe

that Congress would preclude this type of regulation.

The court cited

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973),
for the proposition that state laws must be harmonized with federal
law unless Congress has made its intention to preempt the field very
clear.

The court also cited Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710

(1962), on the dangers of reading statutes too literally.

The federal

principles favoring arbitration are not so rigid as to preclude this
sort of specific state nonwaiver law.
Appees argued that if the remaining issues were to proceed in
arbitration, then the class should first be certified by the TC so
that the arbitration could proceed as a class action.

The court

assumed without deciding that the cases were susceptible to treatment
as a class action, stating that this question would be decided on
remand by the TC.

Without discussing the possible impact of the FAA,

the court then balanced the California policies favoring unencumbered
arbitration and favoring class actions.

It decided that in the

context of contracts of adhesion, class-wide arbitration was
appropriate.

Certainly this ruling will involve the courts in

- 7 -

arbitration more than individual arbitration would: the supervising
court would have to make the initial determinations regarding class
certification and notice to class members: and as arbitration
proceeds, the court might have to "exercise a measure of external
supervision" to protect absent class members.

But the interests

served by class actions justified the encumbrance.
The court remanded to the trial court for a determination whether

j

the arbitrable claims could proceed on a class-wide basis and if so to ~·
draw up the guidelines for this process

It also remanded for a trial

on the Franchise Investment Law claims.
Justice Richardson concurred in the determination that the
arbitration clause is enforceable.

He dissented from the holding that

the Franchise Investment Law claims are not subject to arbitration and
from the finding that class action arbitration is an available remedy.
Wilko is irrelevant to this case because it dealt with balancing two
federal statutes.

Here preemption is at issue, a conflict of a

federal and a state statute.

~he

great majority of lower courts hold

that the FAA creates federal substantive law applicable in both
federal and state courts.

It is irrelevant that Congress has not

preempted the field of franchise regulation.

The point is that

congress has preempted the field "of arbitration as applied
contract in interstate commerce."

to~

The dissent relied in part on cases

from other States holding that their franchise protection statutes
were preempted by the FAA insofar as they would invalidate arbitration
clauses.
The dissent also took issue with the determination that class
_/

arbitration was a proper procedure.

Also relying exclusively on state

- 8 -

law, the dissent found that class action procedures would involve the
judiciary too much in the arbitration process.
4.

CONTENTIONS:

Jurisdictional Issues:

Appees argue that the

Court lacks jurisdiction over the class arbitration claims.

First,

say appees, appnts never argued that the FAA prohibited class
arbitration in the courts below.

Throughout they argued that class

arbitration was inconsistent with state law.

Second, there is not a

final judgment with respect to the class arbitration issue.

~he

court

merely assumed that the cases could be maintained as class actions,
but left that question to the trial court on remand.

The only

possible applicable exception to the rule of Cox Broadcasting Corp v.
Cohn, 420

u.s.

469 (1975), is the fourth one enumerated there: tf the

federal issue has been finally decided and reversal on the federal
issue "will be preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant
cause of action rather than merely controlling the nature and
character of .•. the state proceedings still to come," id., at 483,
and if the state decision might "seriously erode" federal policy, the
final judgment requirement is satisfied.

Here, the state decision

merely sanctions a certain procedure in a continuing litigation and ; is,
thus clearly outside the exception.
Appnts reply that they did raise the argument that the FAA
preempts class arbitration.

In their petn for hearing in that court,

they raised the FAA as a bar to class action arbitration.

They argued

that this procedure was improper under "federal and California law."
They cited many federal cases.
satisfied, they say.
-

The final judgment rule is also

It is true that the dispute between the parties

has not been finally resolved, but the fourth exception of Cox

- 9 -

applies.

The federal issue--whether class arbitration is consistent

with the FAA--has been finally decided.

Reversal would preclude

"further judicial litigation" of the parties' dispute, since the
parties would immediately proceed to individual arbitration, and there
would be no need for continuing judicial supervision.

And the

decision of the court below will seriously erode the federal policy
favoring arbitration.

u.s.

As in Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371

555 (1963), it serves the policies underlying the final judgment

rule "to determine now in which [forum] appellants may [proceed]
rather than to subject them .•. to long and complex litigation which
may be for naught if consideration of the preliminary question .•. is
postponed until the conclusion of the proceedings."
The Merits:
establish that

Appnts argue that the decision below seeks to

~tate

legislatures have the right to single out certain

areas of commerce that shall be exempt from the requirement of the
FAA.

This is in conflict with the decisions of several courts and

clear federal policy.

Second, the class arbitration decision is

unprecedented and potentially destructive of the values the FAA sought
to advance.
With respect to class arbitration, appnts argue that the success
of arbitration depends on freedom from strict judicial rules and
supervision.

Often arbitrators chosen by the parties will not be

attorneys and will be unfamiliar with the complex rules due process
would require for the protection of absent class members.

Moreover,

the process--desirable mostly for its speedy resolution of disputes-will be greatly slowed by requiring recourse to the court at various
~

junctures.

Class action will increase the cost of arbitration--
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perhaps even above the cost of litigation itself.

At the conclusion

of the class arbitration, individual arbitrations on damages and other
special issues would ensue.

Moreover, decertification, which like

certification would be done by the court, is always a possibility.
All of this is inconsistent with the FAA and the parties agreement to
arbitrate on an individual basis according to the rules of the
American Arbitration Association.

In fact, single arbitrations will

be more efficient, for a number of reasons.

But even if class

arbitration were more efficient, the FAA requires that the agreement
of the parties control.

They chose individual arbitration.

See

Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 646 (CA7 1981).
Respecting the Franchise Investment Law, appnts argue that the
FAA clearly requires valid arbitration clauses to govern.
irrelevant because it deals with two federal statutes.
have so held.

Wilko is

Other courts

Ware is irrelevant because the Court there found that

there was no conflict between the federal statute and the state one.
This case presents a direct federal-state conflict.

Because the

California law stands as a clear impediment to realization of the
goals of the federal statute, it must fall.

States cannot create

"exceptions" to a federal statute.
Appees move to dismiss on the jurisdictional grounds mentioned
above and on the ground that there is no substantial federal question.
Respecting the class arbitration, appees urge that the FAA is purely
substantive, requiring arbitration, but leaves to the States the
procedures to be followed in arbitrations.

The class arbitration

issue, therefore, is purely a question of state law.

Second,

respecting the California statute, the court below relied on Wilko

- 11 only as an aid to interpreting the
the Securities Act.

Californi~

act, which was based on

Certain state courts have held that state

antitrust and state securities laws override arbitration agreements on
the ground that the federal courts have construed the corresponding
federal acts to foreclose arbitration clauses.

These state courts

have balanced their state policies against the federal policy in
arbitrating.
Finally, appees argue that ware supports the decision below.

In

Ware, the Court considered an alleged conflict bewteen arbitration
mandated by the New York Stock Exchange under the self-governing
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, and the California Labor
Code, which required a judicial forum.

The stock exchange rules did

not preempt the state law because California manifested a strong
public policy favoring providing its wage earners a judicial forum for
wage disputes.

Southland incorrectly asserts that Ware does not apply

because the FAA itself, 9

u.s.c.

§

1, exempts contracts of employment.

But CAs have held that this section does not include account
executives and that the exception is limited to employees engaged in
the actual movement of interstate goods.

Thus, ware's silence on the

FAA can be attributed only to an implicit holding that States can
ensure that state statutes are enforceable in a court, notwithstanding
the provisions of the FAA.
5.

DISCUSSION:

case appears to be in

Respecting the Franchise Investment Law, this

~rect

conflict :ith Allison v. Medicab

International, Inc., 597 P.2d, at 383 (S. Ct. Wash.).
held:

The court there

- 12 -

"that the supremacy clause of the federal constitution must
prevail and thus the federal arbitration act requires
enforcement of the arbitration clause in the franchise
agreement despite the judicial remedies afforded by the
Franchise Investment Protection ~ct."
The Wisconsin franchise investment law has also been held preempted by ~
~

the FAA to the extent it required a judicial forum despite an
arbitration clause.

Several other States appear to have similar laws.

Thus, the issue presented is one of some
a direct conflict.

importa~ce

-=

on which there is

The issue subsumes the question whether the FAA

imposes a limit on state courts.

This Court has never decided this

question, although most state courts apparently agree with the
California S. Ct. that the statute is of general applicability.

~ppee

has raised this argument as an alternative ground supporting the
judgment below, and thus the court will likely be called upon to
answer it as well, if it notes probable jurisdiction.
this issue has been remanded for trial.

It is true that

But it appears to fit within

the fourth Cox exception: if this Court reverses on the federal
question--finding the state law preempted by the FAA--the case will go
directly to arbitration, effectively terminating judicial proceedings.
Appees do not contest jurisdiction on this issue.

Because the

question presented appears to raise significant preemption issues, and
because appnts invoke this Court's mandatory jurisdiction, this may be
an appropriate issue on which to note probable jurisdiction.
Respecting the "class arbitration" issue, appees raise serious
jurisdictional questions.

It may be, however, that this decision is

final as well, since reversal on the federal question would send the
case directly to arbitration, avoiding the trial court's decision
whether to certify the class and its ensuing supervision of the

- 13 -

arbitration.

It is strictly true that only the procedures governing

future litigation are at issue.
the federal right asserted.

But the procedures are the essence of

If appnts are forced to arbitrate via the

class action, their federal right--at least as they see it--to
individual arbitration pursuant to its contracts is lost, or at least
delayed.

The policies of Langdeau are implicated.

It is equally true

that if the TC decides not to certify a class, the parties will
proceed to individual arbitration anyway, and there will be no adverse
consequences to federal policy.

But the fourth Cox exception

explicitly contemplates that a victory on a state law ground by the
appellant may moot the federal issue.

See 420

u.s.,

at 482-483.

This question seems to me a close one under the final judgment
doctrine.

It also may be somewhat close as to whether the federal

question was properly raised below.

Appnts apparently did phrase the

question presented in terms of federal law and certainly did cite a
number of federal cases in making their argument.

But they apparently

made policy arguments, not preemption arguments, which would suggest a
state law disposition.

Their brief is not included in the papers, so

___

.

.

_

_

.

.

-

arbitration issue probably would not
-

-

-

-

-

-

th~lass
~

On the merits,

-

this issue cannot be satisfactorily assessed at this time.

merit a grant of certiorari on its own.

(It is within the Court's

-appellate jurisdiction only because the other question brings the
entire case within appellate jurisdiction.)

There is no conflict and

the fact that the trial court has not yet devised the procedures to be
applied may make this a difficult issue to assess.

Still, the State

is unquestionably defeating the operation of the arbitration clause in
the individual contracts.

Arguably, this violates the FAA, which--as

- 14 -

the Cal.

s.

enforceable.

Ct. granted--requires that these arbitration clauses be
No other court has ever attempted to engraft class

action rules on arbitration, and as the dissent below stated, class
action procedures may be inconsistent with the fundamental concept of
arbitration.

If the statutory question is reviewed--and if the

federal objection to the decision below was properly raised--the Court
should review this one as well.
6.

RECOMMENDATION:

federal question.

The class arbitration issue should be decided if

the statutory one is.
however.

The statutory issue presents a substantial

There are serious jurisdictional questions,

Consequently, I recommend postponing jurisdiction.
~

There is a motion to dismiss and an opposition to that motion.
December 9, 1982

Ogden

opn in appendix
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Questions Presented
(1)

(A-1
•/.J)I\
~~~~~4.~~/
1

Whether

the

Court

afotate

Whether
law

that

the

the

Whether

'f~~-J-.
Federal

invalidates

franchise agreements.
(4)

over

Whether the the Court has jurisdiction over the class-

wide arbitration issue.
(3)

jurisdiction

~

arbitrability/preemption issue.
(2)

has

a

Arbitration Act

mandatory

(FAA)

arbitration

preempts

clauses

in

~

judicially

arrangement violates the FAA.

imposed

class-wide

arbitration

J~ ~1-~ ~
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BACKGROUND

I•

A.

Statutes

The only jurisdictional statute at issue here is 28
§1257

(1976)

which

gives

the

Supreme

Court

cases appealed from a state's highest court

u.s.c.

jurisdiction over
"where is drawn in

question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of
its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity."
The Cal. S. Ct. relied on the following provision of the Cal.
Franchise Investment Law: (

C T- J

L)

"Any condition, stipulation or
bind any person acquiring any
pliance with any provision of
order hereunder is void." Cal.
1977) •

provision purporting to
franchise to waive comthis law or any rule or
Corp. Code §31512 (West

The appnt contends that this provision of the Cal. Code is
preempted by the following provision of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) through the Supremacy Clause:

"A written provision in
a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract
or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such a contract, transaction or refusal, shall be val- \
id,
irrevocable,
and enforceable,
sav~h
grounds a~ ex1st at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract." 9 U.S.C. §2 (1976).

bench memo: Southland Corp. v. Keating

B.

page 4

Facts

The appnt, Southland, is the franchisor of 7-Eleven stores.
Beginning in May 1977, several of Southland's franchisees filed a
series of suits in Cal. court against the company alleging, inter
alia, common law fraud,
duty, and

breach of contract, breach of fiduciary

violation of the Cal. Franchise Investment Law (CFIL).

The alleged violations of CFIL included willful misstatement and
omission of
under CFIL.

material

facts

in statements

required

to be

filed

Some of the plaintiffs represented a class of all

current and former 7-Eleven franchisees in Cal.
In each of

the

cases Southland moved

compelled to arbitrate.

that

the parties be

In making its motions, Southland relied

on a clause in the franchise agreements that provides:

"[a]ny controversy or claim ar1s1ng out of or relating
to this Agreement or the breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the
American Arbitration Association .•• and judgment upon
any award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in
any court having jurisdiction thereof." J.S. App. 3a

Soon after Southland made its motions, the Cal. Judicial Council
consolidated all of the cases.
In the consolidated case the TC granted Southland's motion
to

compel

arbitration with respect

based on the CFIL.

to all claims except

those

Southland appealed the TC's exclusion of the

CFIL issues from its order compelling arbitration.

The franchi-

sees

none

also

appealed

from

the

order,

claiming

that

of

the
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·.
claims deserved arbitration and seeking a writ of prohibition or
mandamus to compel class-wide arbitration.

C.

Decisions Below

The

Cal.

Ct.

of

arbitrability issue.

App.

agreed

with

Southland

on

the

The court held that the terms of the arbi-

tration clauses of the franchise agreements require arbitration
of all claims, including those based on CFIL.

J.S. App., at 65a.

----------------------------

More importantly, the court found that CFIL does not operate to
invalidate arbitration clauses that relate to CFIL claims.
court

reasoned

that

if

CFIL

were

read

as

invalidating

clauses, it would run afoul of §2 of the RAA.
70a.

The
such

J.S. App., at 66a-

The court also held that the TC was correct in requiring

the franchisees to submit their other claims to arbitration as a
class.

The court of appeals saw "no insurmountable obstacle to
\

conducting

an

arbitration on

a

class-wide

basis."

The

issued a writ of mandate instructing the TC to proceed with
class certification process.
ruled on several other

J.S. App., at 63a.

issues

raised

by

the

court
the

The court also

parties,

none of

which pertain to this appea1. 1

The ~al. '-----S. Ct.

_________

reversed the Ct.
__.... App. on the issue of wheth-

er the CFIL claims were arbitrable.

The S. Ct. relied on a pro-

1 other issues raised in the Cal. Ct. App. include: (1) whether
the TC erred in denying the franchises request for a hearing on
the validity of the arbitration provision; and (2) whether
Southland waived its right to compel arbitration.
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vision of CFIL that voids any provision of an agreement that requires
CFIL.

a

franchisee

to waive compliance with any provision of

See Cal. Corp. Code §31512 (West 1977).

analogy

between

this

Swan, 346 U.S. 427

provision

(1953).

and

that

The court drew an

involved

in Wilko

v.

In Wilko, the Court had to determine

whether §14 of the Securities Act of

1933 invalidated a provi-

sion in an agreement between a brokerage firm and one of its customers that required arbitration of any controversy.
provides:

Section 14

"Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any

person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the
Commission shall be void."

15

u.s .c.

§77n

(1976) •

The Court

construed the agreement to arbitrate as a stipulation that waived
the plaintiffs right to select a judicial forum under §22(a) of
the Securities Act.
Congress

to

give

346 U.S.,

investors

at 434-35.

judicially

overrode the legislative support for

Thus, the desire of

enforceable

protections

arbitration as set out in

the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925.
The

Cal.

S.

Ct.

found

that

the California legislature had

used the Securities Act of 1933 as a model when it drafted CFIL.
The primary purpose of both statutes was to protect investors.
The

court

reasoned

that

since

the

wording of

Cal.

Corp.

Code

§31512 and §14 of the Securities Act is similar, the Cal. legislature intended that §31512 be given the same construction that
the Court gave §14 in Wilko.
The

court

preempts §31512.

then

addressed

the question _ff whether

the FAA

In particular, the court was concerned with §2
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of the FAA, which provides that arbitration clauses of contracts
"shall be

valid,

irrevocable,

and

enforceable,

grounds as exist at law or in equity for
contract."

9 U.S.C. §2 (1976).

ing

for

point

Conklin,

its

388 U.S.

analysis
395

(1967).

save

upon

such

the revocation of any

The court stated that the startmust

be

/ Pr1ma
.
Paint v.

In Prima Paint,

Flood

& {~

the Court held

fJ~

that once a contract was shown to be within the coverage of the
FAA, a federal court can only entertain a claim that the arbitration portion of the contract was fraudulently

induced, while a

claim that the contract as a whole was fraudulently induced must
be decided by an arbitrator.
volved

a

federal

Id., at 403-04.

Prima Painti

in-

court exercising diversity

jurisdiction.

The

Ca. S. Ct. maintained that Prima Paint/
I

/

left open the question

"whether or under what circumstances state courts are constitutionally obligated to apply the substantive principles inherent
in the federal statute."
nal)

J.S. App., at 14a.

(emphasis in origi-

The court found that the federal substantive law would not

control

in

a

state

case

such

as

this

because

its

application

would frustrate a clear legislative policy in Cal. to leave enforcement of the franchise laws to the judiciary.

-

Ct. affirmed the Ct. App.'s holding that the TC

have considered
arbitration

of

the

the

franchisee's request for class-wide
(..c. ~~d~~~\
non-CFIL claims. t:j The court reasonecr-t'ha?

"

were several practical reasons for considering a class-wide

tV

~ pproach

._

~ t,

if a class action could be avoided by the in-

~
~'arbitration clause in a contract, all adhesion con~ts would contain such a clause. Second, because the princi-
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ples of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply in arbitration proceedings,

class-wide arbitration would avoid need-

less duplication and the potential for inconsistent awards.

Fi-

~----------~'---~--------------,-----------------------------nally,
the court stated that the controversies that may arise out
of

widely

used

adhesion contracts present

the sort of

issues and similarly situated parties that are
litigation.

ideal for

dation of similar arbitration proceedings.
that

"better,

class

The court also found precedent for class-wide arbi-

tration in state and federal cases that have allowed the

held

uniform

class-wide

more

arbitration

efficient,

and

In short, the court

proceedings

fairer

solution"

'ht
m1g

than

prov1'd e

---

....

individual

_......-

J.S. App., at 29a. 2
Justice Richardson,

joined by Justice Mosk, dissented from

S. Ct.'s holding that the CFIL claims were not arbitraHe reasoned that the FAA creates a body of national sublaw that
Lawrence Co.

is applicable

in state courts,

v. Devonshire Fabrics, 271 F.

1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).

citing Robert

2d 402, 406

(2d Cir.

As such, §2 of the

FAA preempts conflicting Cal. law regardless of the intent of the
Cal.

legislature.

Justice

Richardson

also

disagreed

with

~

~
a .1-r:J / G

proceedings, but that the TC must make that determination on remand.

~

consoli- ~

the

2The Cal. S. Ct. also adressed the TC's denial of the
franchisees request for a hearing on the issue of whether the
arbitration clause was invalid as part of a contract of adhesion.
The court stated that the contract was adhesive, but that it was
not oppressive. Thus, the arbitration clause was valid and
enforceable. In addition, the court also found taht the TC had
not erred in its holding that Couthland had not waived its right
to compel arbitration.
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majority's holding on the class-wide arbitration issue.

1

He stat-

ed that injection of class action procedures, in the absence of

--------

statutory authority or an express agreement between the parties,
was "fundamentally contrary to the purpose of arbitraation and to
the public policy encouraging arbitration." J

.s.

App.,

at 44a.

./

The dissent did approve of the consolidation of individual arbitration proceedings.

II.

DISCUSSION

A.

.f

Jurisdiction

u/JZ ,, f?~~ \\

J

The Court has reserved judgment on the question of jurisdiction pending the hearing on the merits.

Thus, the jurisdictional

posture of the case remains in controversy.
tend

that

the

Court

has

no

The franchisees conlf1A...-

jurisQiqt ~

over

either

the

arbitrability issue or the suitability of class-wide proceedings.

1.

Arbitrability

With regard to arbi trabi li ty, the franchisees contend that
the arbitration clause in the franchise agreements, by its terms,
does not apply to claims under CFIL.
sees,

According to the franchi-

courts normally will not construe arbitration clauses as

requiring arbitration of statutory claims absent express inclusion of such claims, citing Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. Thompson,
405
F.

u.s.
2d 857

228

(1972)

and Leyva v. Certified Growers of Cal., 593

(9th Cir.), cert.denied, 444

u.s.

827

(1979).

Accord-
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ing to the franchisees, the reason for this rule of construction
is the judicial distrust of the arbitrator's skill in interpreting statutes.
vision at

The franchisees contend that the contractual pro-

issue here not only contains no

parties intended for
fact,

they argue,

They

point

out

indication that the

the clause to cover statutory claims.

In

i ;k:ontains an indication of contrary intent.
that

the

franchise

agreement

provides

that

"[u]nless prohibited by applicable law, any controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach hereof
shall be settled by arbitration •••• "

J.S. App. 49a n.2.

assert that the reference to "applicable law"

They

is an indication

that the parties did not intend for statutory claims to be subject to arbitration.

The franchisees maintain that the applica-

ble law in this case is CFIL and its disclosure provisions begin
to operate before a franchise agreement is executed.

Therefore,

the parties must not have intended the arbitration clause to cover claims under CFIL.
tration,

Since CFIL claims are not subject to arbi-

there is no conflict between CFIL and the FAA, and no

Court jurisdiction over the arbitrability issue.
Southland does

not address

the franchisees'

argument

that

the arbitration clause of the franchise agreement does not cover
CFIL claims.
standable~

The

failure

to confront

this argument

is

under-

the franchisees did not raise this issue in their Mo-

tion to Dismiss For Lack of Jurisdiction.

They raised the issue

as an attack on the Court' : J urisdiction for
their brief.

the first time in

(Southland has not filed a reply brief.)

The reach

of the arbitration clause did come up as a substantive issue in

bench memo:
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'

I

the TC.

The TC construed the franchise agreement as not requir-

ing arbitration of CFIL claims.

The Ct. App. disagreed, holding

that the parties did not need to use language that expressly referred to claims under state franchise law to include them within
the arbitration clause.

The court stated that the parties' use

of the phrase "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement" was a sufficient expression of the parties'

intent

s.

Cal.

to

include CFIL claims.

J. S.

App. ,

at 6 Sa.

The

Ct. had no reason to construe the language of the arbi-

tration clause because it found that CFIL itself precluded arbitration of CFIL claims.

u.s. s.

A line of
see's

argument

that

Ct. cases lends credence to the franchi-

the Court has

no

jurisdiction because the

arbitration clause does not apply to CFIL claims.
Packers,

supra,

Standards Act
cedure

set

an employee filed

a suit under

In Iowa Beef
the Fair Labor

(FLSA}, rather than adhere to the arbitration pro-

out

in

his

union's

The

contract.

Court

dismissed

cert. as improvidently granted because the arbitration clause in
question

covered only disputes

involving

interpretation of

underlying collective- bargaining agreement

(cba}

the

and not claims

based on the FSLA's overtime provisions •

./

In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,

415 U.S. 36 (1974}, the

Cout considered an employer's claim that the arbitration clause
of a cba required an employee to submit his claim of race discrimination

in employment

Title VII claims
brought under

to arbitration.

The Court held that

require different treatment than other claims

provisions of

a cba.

Union adoption of the cba

bench memo: Southland Corp. v. Keating
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individual's Title VII
Id., at 51.

claim,

In the collective

bargaining setting, the "arbitrator is confined to interpretation
and application of the collective-bargaining agreement."

Id., at

53.

/

In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,

u.s.

450

728

(1981), an employer argued that wage claims of individual employees pursuant to the FSLA were barred by prior submission of the
claims to arbitration under the provisions of the cba.
stressed the

-

~on-waivable

The Court

nature of the rights and protections

that the FSLA bestows on individual workers.

Id., at 740.

Court

rights

drew

a

distinction

between collective

and

The

duties

that are subject to arbitration procedures under the provisions
of

a

cba

and

statutory

rights

collective- bargaining process.

that

are

independent

of

the

Id., at 745.

Despite the apparent tendancy of the Court to exclude statutory claims from mandatory arbitration, the franchisee's argument
that Iowa Beef and its progeny control this case is not compelling.

Each of the cases discussed above involved the waiver of

important
cba.

statutory

rights

of

individuals

in the context of

a

The same concerns do not apply to arbitration clauses that

------------~--------------~
negotiated
on an individual basis --~------------------~~
and which do not seek
............--- ....._. ~t f ai ve important statutory rights, even though the underlying

_..---.-.....--------

are

contract is adhesive.

Likewise, a requirement that an arbitra-

tion clause expressly enumerate each legal issue that the parties
wish

to

phrase,

subject
would

to arbitration,

be unworkable.

rather

than using a

Furthermore,

catch-all

the parties'

use of

Southl~nd
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the phrase "unless prohibited by applicable law"

should not be

construed as automatically excluding from the purview of the arbi tration clause any claim that is based on a state or federal
statute.

If

would render

that

were

the

case,

the Uniform Commercial

Code

all similarly worded arbitration clauses virtually

inoperable.

2.

Class-wide proceedings .

With respect to the class arbitration issue, the franchisees
contend that Southland did not present a question of federal law
in

the

state

------

admitted in the Cal.
was governed
decided the

The

courts.

by

franchisees

Ct. App.

state

law.

maintain

that

Southland

that the class arbitration issue
They argue

that

the state courts

issue based on state law and that Southland should

not be allowed to change the focus of their argument just so it
can have its case heard by the Court.
Southland argues that the pleadings it filed with the Cal. S.
Ct. clearly indicated that it was asserting its rights under both
federal and state law.

Southland points out that it cited over

sixty federal cases in its brief to the Cal. S. Ct. and that the
~

court decided the case in the context of the FAA.

Thus, accord-

ing to Southland, there is no merit to the franchisee's argument
that this issue has been raised solely to invoke the jurisdiction
of the Court.
The

u.s.

~anchisees

have

a

valid point.

In Webb v. Webb,

451

493 (1981), the Court reiterated the "long-settled rule that

page 14
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the jurisdiction of this Court to re-examine the final judgment
of a state court can arise only if the record as a whole shows
either expressly or by clear implication that the federal claim
was adequately presented in the state system."
Court

also

present

the

recognized
federal

the

issue properly

failed to pass on the issue.
ell, J., concurring)

presumption
if

the

petr

did

The
not

the highest state court
.........

Id., at 495; cf. id., at 502 (Pow-

(presentation to state court unnecessary if

issue involves fundamental unfairness).
the

that

Id., at 496.

The Cal. S. Ct. decided

issue of class-wide arbitration as a matter of state law,

although it relied on federal cases for

analogous support.

In

its brief to the Cal. S. Ct., Southland cited numerous federal
cases, but it distinguished those cases that approved of the consolidation of individual arbitration proceedings. Southland maintained

that

Cal.,

and

not

federal,

Petition for Hearing in the Cal.

s.

state in its petition to the Cal.

procedures

should

Ct., at 24-25.

s.

control.

Southland did

Ct. that its case was gov-

erned by the FAA, but it did not argue that the FAA should affect
the court's decision on the class arbitration issue.
6 n.6.

Id., at 2,

The Court's jurisdiction should not rest on such passing

references to federal law.

Unless this is the sort of manifest

unfairness to which you referred in your concurrence in Webb, I
do not think the Court has
issue.

jurisdiction over the arbi trabili ty

bench memo: Southland Corp. v. Keating
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Finality

As an alternative ground for dismissing both issues for lack
of jurisdiction, the franchisees point out that Southland is .....,._
not
appealing

from

a

final

judgment.

They contend

that

this case

~------~--~------ --~---

does not fit within any of the recognized exceptions to the final
judgment rule.
are

likely

They argue that further lower court proceedings

to occur

that may change

the

issues

in this case.

Furthermore, they maintain that no federal policy will be undermined by letting

the

case run its course.

With regard to the

class-wide arbitration issue, they concede that the matter arose
on their application for a writ of prohibition, but they contend
that the Cal. S. Ct.'s jurisdiction was based on the controversy
as a whole not just the order denying the application.
Relying

on

previous

u.s. s.

Ct.

statements

that

courts

should take a practical approach to the issue of finality, Southland urges the Court to consider the appeal of the arbitrability
issue

even

likely.

though

further

proceedings

in the

state courts are

Southland contends that the Court must weigh "the incon-

venience and costs of piecemeal review on the oney
danger of denying justice by delay on the other."
lisle & Jacquelin,

417

u.s.

156, 171

(1974).

nd and the

Eisen v. Car-

Southland argues

that this case falls within a well-recognized exception to the
rule that an appeal will lie only from a final judgment as set
out

in

Cox Broadcasting Corp.

v.

Cohn,

420

U.S.

469

(1975).

Under Cox, a non-final state order is nonetheless appealable if:
the state court has made

a

final

decision

regarding a federal

bench memo: Southland Corp. v. Keating
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reversal of the state court would preclude the need for

further litigation; and refusal to allow the appeal might result
in

erosion of

these

federal

conditions

policy.

are met

here.

Southland contends
This

conclusion,

that

all of

according

to

Southland, is reinforced by the fact that failure to review the
state court at this stage effectively may preclude any review of
the

federal

issue,

citing Cohen

v.

Beneficial

Industrial

Loan

Corp., 337 U.s. 541, 546 (1949) •
Southland also argues that the class action issue has met
the finality requirements.

Southland points out that this issue

was raised and decided through a writ of prohibition.

Southland

contends that final disposition of such a writ satisfies the final

judgment

rule.

In

the

alternative,

Southland

argues

that

this issue also falls within the Cox and Cohen exceptions.
The disposition of both issues in the Cal. S. Ct. was sufficiently final to suport the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Ct. App.

decided the class-wide arbitration issue on a writ of

prohibition or mandamus.
the

writ

is

a

court's

decision

courts.

Rescue

(1947).

The

final

The Cal. S. Ct.'s final disposition of

judgment

will
Army

be
v.

even

further
Municipal

though

the

proceedings
Court,

331

effect
in

of

lower

u.s.

549,

the

state
565

Accord Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S.

382, 385 n.7

the~ox

exception to

(1976).
The

arbi trabili ty

issue falls

the final judgment rule.

Consistent with the practical approach

espoused by the Court in the past,
Cal. S. Ct.

within

and the need to review the

decision in light of the policy behind the FAA,

I
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~ ~C'4~~. ~~cd-4~ ~ ~

think that the

~ ~ktL.~ ~ ~Jj_s. i;;f"
Court has jurisdiction over this issue. Requ~
judicial channels postpones

~·

review indefinitely even though final determination of the issue

~ ~

the CFIL claims

to proceed through

by the Court might preclude further proceedings in state

cour~~~

This seems to be just the sort of case contemplated in Cox.

B. Preemption

The question
_,.. of
~

the effect that the FAA has on §31512 of

CFIL is really one of preemEtion rather than arbitrability.
---------

""'"?

-

~

Nei-

ther party contests the Cal. S. Ct.'s interpretation of Cal. law,
i. e., that CFIL renders arbitration clauses, as they pertain to

I

CFIL

related

claim~

void.

The

controversy

whether Congress's expression of favor for- the

revolves
~rbitration

../'

around
proc-

ess in the FAA preempts the Cal. legislature's preference of a

~judicial
~

forum in franchise cases.

Southland relies heavily on the language of §2 of the FAA.

5~ ;ection 2 provides that an arbitration agreement "shall be valid,
~~-~ irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contracts." 3

South-

land contends that Congress had two aims in mind when it passed
the FAA in 1925: to allow parties to avoid the cost and delay of
litigation; and to overrule anti-arbitration decisions in various

3 section 2 also requires that the contract containing the
arbitration clayuse involve interstate commerce. Neither petr
nor resp disputes the interstate character of the franchise
agreement.
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jurisdictions.

(i. e. ,

Southland argues that the proviso in § 2

"save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract") only applies to grounds for revocation
under general principles of contract law such as fraud, duress,
or lack of legal capacity, citing cases from

-

-----...

____,

peals in 6 circuits.

•
(..()~~$' H. Cone Memorial
~ 27, 941 ( ~ ),
eral

u.s.

Courts of Ap~

Southland also quotes language from Moses

Hosp.

v. Mercury Construction Corp., 103 S.Ct.

to the effect that §2 establishes a body of fed-

substantive

law

binding on the states.

favoring

arbitration

agreements

that

is

According to Southland, the effect of the

Cal. S. Ct. decision in this case is to invalidate any arbitration agreement that conflicts with CFIL regardless of whither the
agreement is valid under contract law principles.

Thus, the Cal.

statute directly contravenes the provisions of the FAA and must
be declared invalid under the Supremacy Clause.
Southland would distinguish those cases relied on by the Cal.
S. Ct.

Southland contends that Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner,

and Smith v. Ware,

u.s.

414

117

(1973), is distinguishable be-

cause the state and federal statutes at issue in that case did
not conflict.
Wilko v.

Southland also argues that the court's reliance on

Swan,

346 U.S.

427

(1953),

is misplaced because that

case involved the conflict between the FAA and another
statute, rather than a state statute.

federal

Thus, preemption under the

Supremacy Clause was not an issue in Wilko.
Southland also makes
the Cal.

S.

Ct.

The

some policy arguments for

rule

announced

reversal of

below would undermine the

uniformity of judicial treatment of arbitration clauses, thereby

-----~~----~-~-----
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Another effect of affirmance would be

to hinder the administration of justice by increasing the number
of cases that will be litigated rather than arbitrated.

Finally,

Southland notes that Congress reaffirmed its support for arbitration agreements by expressly providing for arbitration of patent
disputes

in

the

Patent

and

Trademark

Appropriations

Bill

for

1983-1985, 96 Stat. 317 (1982).
The

franchisees

contend

that Southland's

interpretation of

the FAA would give private parties the power to control the forum
for enforcement of important statutory rights; a result uncontemplated by the drafters of the act.
Court that

it has

The franchisees remind the

traditionally hesitated to use the Supremacy

Clause to invalidate a state's exercise of its police power unless preemption was a "clear and manifest" purpose in passing the
conflicting federal legislation.
435 U.S. 151,157

(1978).

~

v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,

The franchisees argue that, where pos-

sible, a court should attempt to reconcile conflicting state and
federal statutes, citing Merrill, Lynch, supra, at 127 and Florida

Lime

Avacado

Growers,

franchisees

find

&

Inc.

v.

Paul,

373

U.S.

132,

142

(1963).
The

a

parallel

between

the

issue here and those reconciled in Merrill, Lynch,

statutes
supra.

at
The

Court in Merrill, Lynch found that a New York Stock Exchange rule
requiring

arbitration of

wage disputes did

not preempt

a Cal.

labor statute that exempted such disputes from arbitration.

The

Court held that the stock exchange rule did not fall under the
Exchange's statutory mandate to protect the investing public and

-- - - - - - ,

page 20
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to

insure

just

and

equitable

trade

practices.

Id.,

at

135.

Therefore, the rule must yield to provisions of state labor laws.
The franchisees contend that this result compels an affirmance of
the Cal. S. Ct. in this case.

,,

The franchisees also rely on the legislative history behind
the FAA as

support

for

their

position.

The

franchisees

argue

that Congress did not intend to include either state or federal
)/statutory claims' within the coverage of the FAA.
~

gress only intended

Instead, Con-

-----------------------------for the FAA to overcome judicial

hostility to

arbitration.

The franchisees would limit the Court's language to

the

in Moses H.

contrary

Cone Hosp.,

supra,

by distinguishing ~

that case as involving common law disputes, rather than
ones.
line

They maintain that the limitation is consistent with
of

claims

cases
of

in

which

individuals

bargaining agreements.

the

from

Court

exempted

arbitration

certain

clauses

of

preempti~~

They argue that j.L

before the FAA comes into play, there must be a valid
clause, referring to the proviso in §2 of the FAA.
provision

~~

collecti ~

~

that the FAA does not apply in this situation.

non-waiver

of

CFIL,

§31512,

the

~

the~

statut~

See ante, at 10-12.

Another of the franchisee's arguments against

I

statutor~

arbitratio~

Relyingon the

franchisees

contend

that the arbitration clause in the franchise agreement is revocable under Cal. law. They contend that, because §31512 renders the
arbitration clause void, the FAA does not apply.

(You might call

this imaginative bootstrapping.)
Finally, the franchisees present a general argument that the
Court should avoid

'Z.: z

construing state statutes in a way that ren-

... ·
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ders them unconstitutional.
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The franchisees also question Con-

gress's power to deny access to state courts by compelling arbitration of state created claims that are unarbitrable under state
law.
The State of Washington

and

Administrators Association filed

the North American Securities
an amicus

rehashes many of the franchisee's arguments.

brief.

Their

brief

They seem particu-

larly concerned, however, with the interplay between state securities laws and state franchise laws.

They point out that state

-------------------------------------

franchise laws and state securities laws employ similar language
and have the same purpose -- the protection of investors.

The

amici argue that since federal courts have held that the federal
securities

laws

override

the provisions of

the FAA,

and state

courts have adopted the same view when construing state securities laws,

the Court should not preempt similarly worded fran-

chise laws.
When it passed the FAA, Congress intended it as an instruction to the judiciary to be more receptive to arbitration agreements.

Congress probably did not foresee that the FAA would be

used to limit state statutes.
lative
with

intent that the FAA be

the

Court's

traditional

The absence of a clear-cut legisimplied in this fashion,
reluctance

to

find

coupled

preemption of

state statutes, provides strong support for the franchisee's position. Nevertheless, the Court stated last term in Moses H. Cone
Hosp.:

bench memo: Southland Corp. v. Keating
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"Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal ~
federal
policy
favoring
arbitration
agreements,
notwi thstatnding any state substantive or procedural
policies to the contrary. The effect of the section is -to create a body of federal substantive law of
arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement ~
within the coverage of the Act • • • • [Q]uestions of
.
arbi trabili ty must be addressed with a heal thy regard
for the federal policy favoring arbitration. • • • The
Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of feder- ~~
al law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration,
~
whether the problem at hand is the construction of the ;=:./;If
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver,
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Moses H.
Cone Hosp., supra, at 942-943.

h-:::2
tJ!!

The

franchisees

try

to distinguish Moses H.

4

Cone Hosp. on the

ground that it involved common law claims and this case involves
statutory claims.
has

no

foundation

-------·"'--

broad

language

Such a distinction does not make sense,
in

used

~-----------------------------

the opinion,

in that case.

especially
Although

in

1 ight

and

of

the

the potential

for

abuse of arbitration clauses, particularly in adhesion contracts,
is great, I think Moses H. Cone Hosp. requires a reversal of the
Cal. S. Ct. on this issue.

c.

Class-wide Arbitration

Southland argues

the Cal. S. Ct.'s instruction that the TC

should consider a class-wide arbitration violates the spirit
the FAA.

of ~/T

According to Southland, the reason parties opt for ar-

bitration is

its ease,

informality, and speed.

By ruling that

arbitration in this case must proceed on a class-wide basis, the
court appended a time-consuming, costly, complex, and difficultto-manage process to one designed for
tion,

a

its simplicity.

class-wide arbitration requires

5~ 1

In addi-

judicial management at

bench memo: Southland Corp. v. Keating

every stage.

page 23

Southland contends that the FAA allows the parties

to decide whether to arbitrate and the procedure that should govern the arbitration, and the court should not disturb these decisions.
in

the

Finally, Southland argues that the complexities inherent
arbitration

process

would

make

it

difficult

to

find

skilled arbitrators who would be willing to take the case.
The

franchisees

assert

that

class-wide

arbitration will

less cumbersome than numerous individual cases.

be

They argue that

7
~

the procedure is consistent with the liberal federal policy favor ing arbitration because
use

of

class

actions

in

the policy reasons that support the
the

normal

equally to the arbitration setting.

litigation

setting

apply

Thus, class-wide arbitration

does not violate the spirit of the FAA.
The franchisees also argue that Cal. should have say-so over
what procedures

are proper.

Assuming that the substantive as-

pects of §2 of the FAA apply to this case, the procedures that a
state court should use to implement the FAA are state procedures.
There is no provision in the FAA that requires substitution of
federal procedures for state ones, citing Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp., supra, at 942-43 & n.32.
ed

that

class-wide

arbitration

Since the Cal. S. Ct. has decidis

an

acceptable

procedure

in

Cal., the Court should not substitute its opinion on the subject.
The

franchisees

mentioned

1

brief

in Southland 1 s

also addresses many of the concerns

brief.

According

to the

franchisees,

judicial participation in the arbitration process is not unusual.
Courts often order that the consolidation of two or more arbitrations.

The Fed. R. Civ. P. authorize motions to compel arbitra-

7,

page 24
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tion,

set out

the procedure for
to

dismiss

even

pre-arbitration discovery,
though

arbitration

is

and

permit

motions

taking

place.

The franchisees argue that none of the difficulties an-

ticipated by Southland will actually occur, and if the proceedings do get out of hand, the Cal. courts have the power to declare the

arbitration clause

in the franchise agreement uncon-

scionable and, thus, invalid.
The reason that Southland did not dwell on the federal aspects

of

this

case

in

the

lower

courts

(as

discussed

Jurisdiction above)

under

is that there really are no federal aspects.
...
__.
,_,l:w= .....................
The FAA is silent on the suitability of arbitration in class ac-

-

twa~~

tion situations.

There is no case law on the subject.

As the

----------------------~

Cal. S. Ct. points out, the closest analogy is the consolidation
of individual arbitration proceedings_L a procedure that has received some

judicial acceptance.

A student note in the Va. L.

Rev. approves of the procedure adopted by the Cal.
some alterations.

s.

Ct., with

Classwide Arbitration: Efficient Adjudication

or Procedural Quagmire?, 67 Va. L. Rev. 787 (1981).

I think that

since this question does not rise to the level of due process,
the Cal. S. Ct. word on what is proper procedure in Cal. should
prevail.
Although the briefs do not go this far,

I think an argument

be made that the "body of substantive law" language in Moses
Memorial Hosp. means that the courts must come up with a
body of federal common law to fill in the interstices.

The ques-

tion of class-wide arbitration would be one of those interstices.

bench memo:

entitled

to

Southl~nd

some

Corp. v. Keating

deference,

see Hart

page 25

&

Wechsler,

The Federal

Courts and the Federal System, at 778-779,825-829 (2nd ed. 1973),
and might be controlling if this is purely a question of procedure.

In addition, I think the Cal. S. Ct. was right; class-wide

arbitration seems to be a useful procedure in this case.

j~

~~

III. CONCLUSION

~he

Court has jurisdiction over the arbitrability/preemption

issue ~he

strong

language

regarding

arbitration

. v

1n Moses H.

Cone Memorial Hosp. leads to the conclusion that the FAA preempts
the non-arbitrability aspects of the

CFIL.~e ~ourt

---

has no ju-

risdiction with respect to the question of the appropriateness of
class-wide

arbitration because Southland failed

to present

the

federal issue to the Cal. S. ct (j[Jven if there is jurisdiction,
"'"'""""---

~--

......

----

the Cal. S. Ct. is entitled to decide whether a class-wide arbitration is acceptable.
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Memorandum
To: Justice Powell
From: Rob

on ~outhland
...

Re: Another update

v.

Keating~

No. 82-500

..

I had a long discussion with one of Justice O'Connors clerks
at lunch today about the Southland case.
propounded

by

issue that I
point

the

briefs)

about

the

soft spot)

(not

preemption/arbitrability

thought might interest you.

(and major

He has a theory

His theory's starting

is that the statement in Moses H.

Cone that the FAA creates a body of federal substantive law that

~-~~.~lies

9 ~history
~ have
I_:_
TV

t,,,t.

to the states is dicta.

~::ates

behind the FAA

He contends that the legislative '
that Congress did

~

intend to

the provisions of the FAA apply to actions in state courts.

Instead, Congress intended that the FAA create a body of substantive law to apply only in federal diversity cases, a common congressional purpose prior

to Erie R.

Co..

Thus,

to the extent

that it survived the Erie R. Co. decision, the FAA's provisions
only apply to cases filed in federal court.

Because the appees

"

filed

this

action

in Cal.

court,

the FAA does not preempt the

Cal. courts' treatment of the CFIL claims.
Justice O'Connor's clerk's certainly has a better grasp of
the FAA's legislative history than I do.
points come straight from a dissent

In fact, many of his

that ~stice

Black wrote in

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 416
(1967).
'(~

The problem with his theory is twofold.

guage in Moses H. Cone cannot be dismissed easily.

First, the lanIn that opin-

ion Justice Brennan is very explicit and relies on the majority
opinion

in~ rima

Paint.

Second, the clerk's theory would lead to

widespread forum shopping.
tration

and can do so

If a plaintiff wishes to avoid arbi-

simply by filing in state court, he will

file in state court and fight removal to federal district court.
In short, I do not adhere to the new theory, but I suspect that
you will he'tf about it again.

Sec. 4

ENFORCING STATE- CREATED RIGHTS

731

Vermont law an agreement to arbitrate is revocable at any time prior to an
award and is therefore not enforceable. The Second Circuit reversed, but
the Supreme Court agreed with the district court, saying (p. 203):

'' • • • If the federal court allows arbitration where the state court
would disallow it, the outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse
where suit is brought. For the remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits
or shortcomings, substantially affects the cause of action created by the State.
The nature of the tribunal where suits· are tried is an important part of the
parcel of rights behind a cause of action."
The Court held, as a matter of statutory construction, that the provisions
for judicial enforcement of certain agreements to arbitrate in the United
States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1- 14, 2 did not apply to the case at hand,
noting (p. 202) that "If respondent's contention (that the Act applied)
is correct, a con stitutional question might be presented. Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins indicated that Congress does no't have the constitutional authority
to make the law that is applicable to controversies in diversity of citizenship
cases.'' ·
r--__;;;;
Is~
an
:.:.J thing left of Guffey after Bernhardt?

\

:

....

( 6 ~e constitutional question raised in Be rnhardt was answe~ed, in
part, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395
I ( 1967). 1 In this diversity action, Prima sought rescission of a consulting
agreement on the basis of fraudulent inducement, and Flood & Conklin,
relying on the Arbitration Act, filed a motion to stay the action pending
arbitration of the issue of fraud under an arbitration clause in the contract.
The Supreme Court held, 6-3, that the stay was properly granted under the
Act, even though such a stay (for arbitration of the issue of fraud) might
not have been obtainable had the action been brought in a state court. The
Arbitration Act applied because, unlike the contract at issue in Bernhardt,
the contract in Prima was one "evidencing a transaction involving commerce"
within the meaning of § 2 of the Act. Application of the Act was constitutionally permissible because the question in the case was "not whether Congress may fashion federal substantive rules to govern questions arising in
simple diversity cases"; rather it was "whether Congress may prescribe how
federal courts are to conduct themselves with respect to subject matter (interstate commerce] over which Congress plainly has power to legislate" .
The answer, the Court concluded, "can only be in the affirmative" (p. 405 ).
But the Court carefully avoided any explicit endorsement of the view that
2.

•

3

The ArlJitration Act, ori~inally enacted in 1!)25, JlrO\'ides in § 2 that a
written arhitration pro\'i~ion "in any
maritime transaction or a contra('t e\'i tlencin~ a transaction in\'olYin,:: com merce •
• sha 11 he \'a lid, i rre\'ocahle, :uul l'llforc<•ahle, sa,·e upon
such grouculs as exist at law or in
equity for the re,·ocation of any con·
tract"; in § 3 that a federal court
in which suit is hronght on an is~nc
referrahle to arlJitration hy an arbitration a~,:ri'<'IIH'IIt mnst stay its own
procee<lings peucling arhitration once
it has <lecicle<l that the issou• is arhitrahle unclcr the agreencent; :uul in
§ -l that a fecleral conrt whosp as-

sistancc is properly irn·okecl hy a party
to an arbitration a,::reenrent !'hail order arhitration.
3.

Sec StPm \'. South Chl•ster Tube Co.,
3!)0 U.S. GOG, GW-10 (l!lGS): "\\'e n('('cl
not clf'eiclf' whethf'r this [dh·e•·sity action] is a case where such a federal
rcmc<ly can he prodclecl C\'Cll in the
alJsence of a similar state remedy,
!'>hlly Oil Co. , .. Phillips Co., 33!l U.S.
CG7, GI-l (JQ;"-.Q); ct. Guffey Y. Smith,
2:37 U .:-5. 101 (lfJl:il, h<·cause it is clear
that state law here also prO\'iclcs for
l'nforc·eflrL'nt of the shareholder's right
[to inspect corporate records] by a
<'OIIIJllllsory judicial order."

be a) lied
to a contracts within its scope, w et er sue on Jn state or ederal courts.
This view had been a ope m o er awrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,
Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cerl. granted, 362 U.S. 909, dismisud
11nder R11/e 60, 364 U.S. 801 ( 1960), and Justice Harlan, concurring in
Prima, said that he "would also affirm the judgment below" on the basis
of Devonshire (p. 407).
"u: .ruonra!lon 1\ct embodied substantive policies that were to

How stable is the result in the Prima case if it contemplates different
remedies in federal and state courts for breach of the same contract? 4 Compare the demise of a similar (but converse)' distinction between state and
federal remedies in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235
(1970), p. 1201, infra.
(7) Are considerations different from those in Guffey and Bernhardt
involved when state law, and particularly the availabili~y of an equitable
remedy in the state courts, is urged not as a reason for denying federal equitable relief but for granting it? To what extent do Erie-Klaxon-York require
federal courts to mirror state courts in this respect also?
In Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491 ( 1923), a Delaware
statute authorizing the appointment of a receiver upon the application of a
simple contract creditor \Vas denied enforcement. In a much-cited opinion
for the Court, Justice Brandeis said (pp. 497- 99):
"That this suit could not be maintained in the absence of the statute
is clear. A receiver is often appointed upon application of a secured creditor
who fears that his security will be. wasted. Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co.,
107 U.S. 3 78, 395. A receiver is often appointed upon appliciltion of a
judgment creditor who has exhausted his legal remedy. See White v. Ewing,
159 U.S. 36. But an unsecured simple contract creditor has, in the absence
of statute, no substantive right, legal or equitable, in or to the property of
his debtor. This is true, whatever the nature of the property; and although
the debtor is a corporation and insolvent. The only substantive right of a
simple contract creditor is to have his debt paid in due course. His adjective right is, ordinarily at law. He has no right whatsoever in equity until
he has exhausted his legal remedy. After execution upon a judgment recovered at law has been returned unsatisfied, he may proceed in equity by
a creditor's bill. Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U.S. 3 71
• • • He may, by such a bill, remove any obstacle to satisfying his execution at law; or may reach assets equitable in their nature; or he may provisionally protect his debtor's property from misappropriation or waste,
by means either of an injunction or a receiver. Whether the debtor be an
4.

In A/S J. Ludwig ~rowinckels Rederi
, .. Dow Chem. Co., 25 N.Y.2d 57G, 255
K.E.2d 774 (JD70), the petitioner
l>rought a ;;tate c-ourt action to enjoin
arbitration under a maritime c-ontract
on gr·oun!ls that would conceded ly have
hecn unaYailable to him in a federal
court because of the Federal Arbitration Act. After cxtensin? analysis of
l'rima Paint, the New York Court of
Appeals concluded that at least in the
case of a maritime contract, where
federal substantive law "controls" all
a~pccts of the agreement, the Arbitra-

tion Act had to be applied in the state
courts as wei!" as in the federal courts.
The effect of this conclusion was to
deny a stay of arbitration hecause
such a stay would ha,·e been unavailable in a federal court. Compare In re
Vigo S. S. Corp., 2G N.Y.2d 157, 162,
257 ?\.E.2d 624, G2G (J!JIO) (consolidation of arbitration proceedings under
maritime contracts allowed pursuant
to state law; the issue was "procedural" and "not ln any way determinath·e of the outcome of the disputes on the merits").
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Memorandum
To: Justice Powell
From: Rob
Date:
Re:

August 10, 1983
Southland v. Keating, No. 82-500

Southland's reply brief came in yesterday.

--·--------

only two new points in this brief.

Southland raised

First, it responds to appees'

argument that the arbitration clause by its own terms does not
cover appees' CFIL claims.

Southland asserts that the appees did

not make this argument in the Cal. S. Ct. and, therefore, they
are foreclosed from making it now.

Southland maintains that, in

any event, appees' argument is meritless because it is not a valid

attack

reading

on

the Court's

jurisdiction and

to the arbitration clause.

gives

too

narrow

a

Because I saw no merit in

the appees' argument anyway, the V:eply brief does not affect the
analysis in my bench memo.
The second new argument

in the

reply brief

applies to the

appees' contention that the Cal. courts could circumvent the FAA
by finding the arbitration clause of the franchise agreement unconscionable.

Southland argues

that

the appees have failed

to

identify any provision of the franchise agreement that is unconscionable.
based

It also asserts that a finding of unconscionability

solely on

arbi trabi li ty grounds would

violate §2 of

the

;

"

page 2.

FAA.

The appees' reference to unconscionability is intended to

show only that the Cal. courts would retain control over a classwide arbitration, and is not an integral part of their argument.
The remainder of the reply brief

simply ~ehashes or restates

arguments made in Southland's original brief.

The Southland Corp. v. Keating
Memo:

To my Clerk

From:

L.F.P., Jr.
This .case is here on appeal from the Supreme Court of

California.
poned".

I do not recall whether we "Noted" or "Post-

Nor do I recall whether this is one of the cases

assigned for a summer bench memo.

I have now taken a pre-

liminary look at the opinions below, and the briefs.

The case

is important with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
I am not fully familiar with the area, the questions are not
easy, and accordingly I particularly need help from my clerk.
Apart from alerting my clerk to this need, this memo merely
identifies - briefly - the issues in summary form - as I presently understand them.
The Controversey
Southland, a Texas corporation that owns and franchises
7/11 convenience stores in many states, has several hundred
franchisees in California.
Appellees here (plaintiffs below) are several California
franchisees who initially instituted separate suits against
Southland.

Allegations included violations of the disclosure

2.

requirements of the California Franchise Investment Law a statute quite similar to the Uniform State Securities Acts.
In addition, there are various common law allegations of fraud
and breach of contract.

After Southland's unsuccessful attempt

to transfer the litigation to Federal Court, appellees separate
suits were consolidated in this state case.

It has gone up

through the three tiers of California courts on the substantitive
issues presented by this appeal, but has not yet been tried on
its merits.

In a rather impressively written opinion, the

California Supreme Court decided these issues in favor of
appellees, with two of six Justices dissenting in significant
part.
Our Jurisdiction
The parties initially debate our jurisdiction because the
"bottom line" of the California decision is to remand the case
to the trial court.

My present impression is that, as argued

by appellants, we have jurisdiction under the principles of
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan.

Controlling issues of law,

including applicability of the FAA, have been finally decided.

The Preemption Issue
Southland's franchise agreements contain an arbitration
clause providing:

3.
"[a)ny controversy or claim arising out of
or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof
shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with
the Rules of the American Arbitration Association ••.
and judgment upon any award rendered by the arbitrator
may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof."

Southland has argued from the beginning that its arbitration clause is enforceable and mandatory, and precludes this
litigation.

As I understand the situation, it is necessary to

keep in mind the two types of claims asserted by appellees:
(i)

that Southland v iolated § 31202 of the California

Corporation Code by making untrue statements of material fact,
and willfully omitting to include all material £acts,
in violation of the state's Franchise Investment Act;
(ii)

that Southland was guilty of common law fraud and

breach of contract.
The Franchise Investment Act provides:
"Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to
bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance
with any provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void."

4.

The California Court held, with respect to the preemption
issue, that the issue is as follows:
"Whether the principles of substantitive Federal
law embodied in the Federal Arbitration Act preclude a
state from protecting its franchise investors through a
system of statutory regulation including nonwaivability
of judicial remedies."

In answering this question negatively (i.e. no Federal
preemption), the California Court relied in major part on its
view that the California Legislature intended to adopt in its
Franchise Investment Law the same "antiwaiver" provisions that
Congress had included in the Federal Securities Acts.
Wilko v. Swan, 346

u.s.

In

427, this Court interpreted these

act as holding that judicial remedies could not be waived in
advance by contract.

In other words, certain types of rights

created for the protection of the public may be vindicated in
a court regardless of the waiver of judicial remedies implicit
in the Federal Arbitration Act.
As persuasive as the opinion of the California Court is
on the preempt i on issue, the appellants' brief (by Arnold
and Porter) - at least on the surface - appears to give
equally persuasive answers.

See also Justice Richardson's

5.
dissenting opinion on this issue.

But compare the arguments

made in the amicus brief on behalf of the State of Washington
and the North American Securities Administrators Association.

The Class Action Issue
The second major issue in the case is whether the California
Court correctly held ~at a class action - under the California
Class Action Procedure - could be appropriate in this case, and
remanded the case for consideration by the trial court of the
extent to which a class action will be appropriate even in
complying with the arbitration provisions of the franchise
agreements. ·
Again, rather persuasive arguments are advanced on both
sides of this issue.

At this point, I am not familiar enough

with the case or the authorities relied upon, to have even a
tentative view.

Intuitively, I would think class action proce-

dures inherently are incompatible with the basic purposes of
arbitration.

* * *
There are other aspects of this case that l have not
identified in this breif memo.

L.F.P., Jr.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME,COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 82-500

SOUTHLAND CORPORATION, ETAL., APPELLANTS v.
RICHARD D. KEATING ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
[January - , 1984]

CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We noted probable jurisdiction to consider (a) whether the
California Franchise Investment Law, which invalidates certain arbitration agreements covered by the Federal Arbitration Act, violates the Supremacy Clause and (b) whether arbitration under the Federal Act is impaired when a class
action structure is imposed on the process by the state
courts.
I
Appellant The Southland Corporation is the owner and
franchisor of 7-Eleven convenience stores. Southland's
standard franchise agreement provides each franchisee with
a license to use certain registered trademarks, a lease or sublease of a convenience store owned or leased by Southland,
inventory financing, and assistance in advertising and merchandising. The franchisees operate the stores, supply
bookkeeping data, and pay Southland a fixed percentage of
gross profits. The franchise agreement also contains the
following provision requiring arbitration:
"Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to
this Agreement or the breach thereof shall be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American
Arbitration Association . . . and judgment upon any
award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any
court having jurisdiction thereof."
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Appellees are 7-Eleven franchisees. Between September
1975 and January 1977, several appellees filed individual actions against Southland in California Superior Court alleging,
among other things, fraud, oral misrepresentation, breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the disclosure requirements of the California Franchise Investment
Law, Cal. Corp. Code § 31000 et seq. (West 1977). Southland's answer, in all but one of the individual actions, included the affirmative defense of failure to arbitrate.
In May 1977, appellee Keating filed a class action against
Southland on behalf of a class that assertedly includes approximately 800 California franchisees. Keating's principal
claims were substantially the same as those asserted by the
other franchisees. After the various actions were consolidated, Southland petitioned to compel arbitration of the
claims in all cases, and appellees moved for class certification.
The Superior Court granted Southland's motion to compel
arbitration of all claims except those claims based on the
Franchise Investment Law. The court did not pass on appellees' request for class certification. Southland appealed
from the order insofar as it excluded from arbitration the
claims based on the California statute. Appellees filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition in the California
Court of Appeal arguing that the arbitration should proceed
as a class action.
The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's
refusal to compel arbitration of appellees' claims under the
Franchise Investment Law. 167 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1980).
That court interpreted the arbitration clause to require arbitration of all claims asserted under the Franchise Investment Law, and construed the Franchise Investment Law not
to invalidate such agreements to arbitrate. 1 Alternatively,
the court concluded that if the Franchise Investment Law
' Cal. Corp. Code § 31512 provides: "Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void."

.
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rendered arbitration agreements involving commerce unenforceable, it would conflict with § 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U. S. C. §2 (1976), and therefore be invalid under the
Supremacy Clause. 167 Cal. Rptr. at 493-494. The Court
of Appeal also determined that there was no "insurmountable
obstacle" to conducting an arbitration on a classwide basis,
and issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to conduct class certification proceedings. I d., at 492.
The California Supreme Court, by a vote of 4-2, reversed
the ruling that claims asserted under the Franchise Investment Law are arbitrable. 31 Cal. 3d 584, 645 P. 2d 1192
(1982). The California Supreme Court interpreted the Franchise Investment Law to require judicial consideration of
claims brought under that statute and concluded that the
California statute did not contravene the federal Act. I d., at
604, 645 P. 2d, 1203-1204. The court also remanded the case
to the trial court for consideration of appellees' request for
classwide arbitration.
We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - (1982).
We reverse in part and dismiss in part.
II
A

Jurisdiction of this Court is asserted under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1257(2) which provides for an appeal from a final judgment
of the highest court of a state when the validity of a challenged state statute is sustained as not in conflict with federal
law. Here Southland challenged the California Franchise
Investment Law as it was applied to invalidate a contract for
arbitration made pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.
Appellee argues that the action of the California Supreme
Court with respect to this claim is not a "final judgment or
decree" within the meaning of § 1257(2).
Under Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469,
482-483 (1975), judgments of state courts that finally decide a
federal issue are immediately appealable when "the party
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seeking review here might prevail [in the state court] on the
merits on nonfederal grounds, thus rendering unnecessary
review of the federal issue by this Court, and where reversal
of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of
any further litigation on the relevant cause of action. . . ."
In these circumstances, we have resolved the federal issue "if
a refusal immediately to review the state-court decision
might seriously erode federal policy." Id., at 483.
The judgment of the California Supreme Court with respect to this claim is reviewable under Cox Broadcasting,
supra. Without immediate review of the California holding
by this Court there may be no opportunity to pass on the federal issue and as a result "there would remain in effect the
unreviewed decision of the State Supreme Court" holding
that the California statute does not confict the Federal Arbitration Act. I d., at 485. On the other hand, reversal of a
state court judgment in this setting will terminate litigation
of the merits of this dispute.
Finally, the failure to accord immediate review of the decision of the California Supreme Court might "seriously erode
federal policy." Plainly the effect of the judgment of the
California court is to nullify a valid contract made by private
parties under which they agreed to submit all contract disputes to final, binding arbitration. The federal Act permits
"parties to an arbitrable dispute [to move] out of court and
into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible." Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,
- u. s. - , - (1983).
Contracts to arbitrate are not to be avoided by allowing
one party to ignore the contract and resort to the courts.
Such a course could lead to prolonged litigation, one of the
very risks the parties, by contracting for arbitration, sought
to eliminate. In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U. S. 1, 12 (1972), we noted that the contract fixing a particular forum for resolution of all disputes
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"was made in an ann's-length negotiation by experienced
and sophisticated businessmen, and absent some compelling and countervailing reason it should be honored by
the parties and enforced by the courts."
The Zapata court also noted that
"the forum clause was a vital part of the agreement, and
it would be unrealistic to think that the parties did not
conduct their negotiations, including fixing the monetary
terms, with the consequences of the forum clause figuring prominently in their calculations." Id., at 14.
For us to delay review of a state judicial decision denying
enforcement of the contract to arbitrate until the state court
litigation has run its course would defeat the core purpose of
a contract to arbitrate. We hold that the Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts
§ 31512 of the California Franchise Investment Law.
B

That part of the appeal relating to the propriety of superimposing class action procedures on a contract arbitration
raises other questions. Southland did not contend in the
California courts that, and the State courts did not decide
whether, State law imposition class action procedures was
preempted by federal law. When the California Court of
Appeal directed Southland to address the question whether
state or federal law controlled the class action issue, Southland responded that State law did not permit arbitrations to
proceed as class actions, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were inapplicable, and that requiring arbitrations to
proceed as class actions "could well violate the [federal] constitutional guaranty of procedural due process." 2 Southland
did not claim in the Court of Appeal that if State law required
Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Petition for Writs of Mandate or Prohibition at 19-25.
2
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class action procedures, it would conflict with the federal Act
and thus violate the Supremacy Clause.
In the California Supreme Court, Southland argued that
California law applied but that neither the contract to arbitrate nor State law authorized class action procedures to govern arbitrations. Southland also contended that the Federal
Rules were inapplicable in State proceedings. Southland
pointed out that although California law provided a basis for
class action procedures, the Judicial Council of California acknowledged "the incompatibility of class actions and arbitration." Petition for Hearing at 23. It does not appear that
Southland opposed class procedures onfederal grounds in the
California Supreme Court. 3 Nor does the record show that
the California Supreme Court passed upon the question
whether superimposing class action procedures on a contract
arbitration was contrary to the federal Act. 4
The question Southland presented to the state Supreme Court was
"[w]hether a court may enter an order compelling a private commercial arbitration governed by the Federal Arbitration Act ... to proceed as a class
action even though the terms of the parties' arbitration agreement do not
provide for such a procedure." Southland argued that (1) the decision of
the Court of Appeal "is in conflict with the decisions of other Courts of Appeal in this State," Petition for Hearing at 3; (2) class actions would delay
and complicate arbitration, increase its cost, and require judicial supervision, "considerations [which] strongly militate against the creation of class
action arbitration procedures," id., at 22; and (3) there was no basis in law
for class actions. According to appellants, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not apply in California courts. I d., at 23. Southland thus relied, not on federal law, but on California law in opposing class action
procedures.
4
The California Supreme Court cited "[a]nalogous authority'' supporting consolidation of arbitration proceedings by federal courts. E. g.,
Campania Espanola de Petrolowos, S . A . v. Nereus Shipping, S. A ., 527
F. 2d 966, 975 (CA2 1975), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 936 (1976); In re
Czarnikow-Rionda Co ., 512 F . Supp. 1308, 1309 (SDNY 1981). This,
along with support by other state courts and the California legislature for
consolidation of arbitration proceedings permitted the court to conclude
that class action proceedings were authorized: "It is unlikely that the state
Legislature in adopting the amendment to the Arbitration Act authorizing
3
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Since it does not affirmatively appear that the validity of
the State statute was "drawn in question" on federal grounds
by Southland, this Court is without jurisdiction to resolve
this question as a matter of federal law under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1257(2). See Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U. S. 203, 207
(1945).
III
The California Franchise Investment Law provides:
"Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to
bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or order
hereunder is void." Cal. Corp. Code § 31512 (West
1977).
The California Supreme Court interpreted this statute to require judicial consideration of claims brought under the State
statute and accordingly refused to enforce the parties' contract to arbitrate such claims. So interpreted the California
Franchise Investment Law directly conflicts with § 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act and violates the Supremacy Clause.
In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of
the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act provides:
"A written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arisconsolidation of arbitration proceedings, intended to preclude a court from
ordering class wide arbitration in an appropriate case. We conclude that a
court is not without authority to do so." 31 Cal. 3d, at 613, 645 P. 2d, at
1209. The California Supreme Court thus ruled that imposing a class action structure on the arbitration process was permissible as a matter of
state law.

•
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ing out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract." 9 U. S. C. § 2 (1976).
Congress has thus mandated the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.
We discern only two limitations on the enforceability of arbitration provisions governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act: they must be part of a written maritime contract or a
contract "evidencing a transaction involving commerce" 5 and
such clauses may be revoked upon "grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract." We see nothing in the Act indicating that the broad principle of enforceability is subject to any additional limitations under State
law.
The Federal Arbitration Act rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause.
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Corp., 388 U. S. 395 (1967), the Court examined the legislative history of the Act and concluded that the statute "is
based upon ... the incontestable federal foundations of 'control over interstate commerce and over admiralty."' Id., at
405 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1924)). The contract in Prima .Paint, as here, contained an
arbitration clause. One party in that case alleged that the
other had committed fraud in the inducement of the contract,
although not of arbitration clause in particular, and sought to
have the claim of fraud adjudicated in federal court. The
Court held that, notwithstanding a contrary state rule, consideration of a claim of fraud in the inducement of a contract
"is for the arbitrators and not for the courts," id., at 400.
6
We note that in defining "commerce" Congress declared that "nothing
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class or workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. " 9 U. S. C. § 1 (1976).

.-
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The Court relied for this holding on Congress' broad power to
fashion substantive rules under the Commerce Clause. 6
At least since 1824 Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause has been held plenary. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9
Wheat. 1, 196 (1824). In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, the authority of Congress is "the power to regulate;
that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed." Ibid. The statements of the Court in Prima Paint
that the Arbitration Act was an exercise of the Commerce
Clause power clearly implied that the substantive rules of the
Act were to apply in state as well as federal courts. As Justice Black observed in his dissent, when Congress exercises
its authority to enact substantive federal law under the Commerce Clause, it normally creates rules that are enforceable
in state as well as federal courts. Prima Paint, 388 U. S.,
at 420 (Black, J., dissenting).
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., - - U. 8., at - - , - - n. 32, we reaffirmed our view that the Arbitration Act "creates a body of
federal substantive law" and expressly stated what was implicit in Prima Paint, i. e., the substantive law the Act created was applicable in state and federal court. Moses H.
Cone began with a petition for an order to compel arbitration.
The Di~trict Court stayed the action pending resolution of a
concurrent state court suit. In holding that that the District
Court had abused its discretion, we found no showing of exceptional circumstances justifying the stay and recognized
"the presence of federal-law issues" under the federal Act as
"a major consideration weighing against surrender [of federal
jurisdiction]." Id., at--. We thus read the underlying
issue of arbitrability to be a question of substantive federal
The procedures to be used in an arbitration are not prescribed by the
federal Act. We note, however, that Prima Paint, supra, considered the
question of what issues are for the courts and what issues are for the
arbitrator.
6
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law: "Federal law in the terms of the Arbitration Act governs
that issue in either state or federal court." I d., at - - .
Although the legislative history is not without ambiguities,
there are strong indications that Congress had in mind something more than making arbitration agreements enforceable
only in the federal courts. The House Report plainly suggests the more comprehensive objectives:
"The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforcible
agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or admiralty, or which may be the subject of litigation in the
Federal courts." H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1924) (Emphasis added.)

l

This broader purpose can also be inferred from the reality
that Congress would be less likely to address a problem
whose impact was confined to federal courts than a problem
of large significance in the field of commerce, problem Cerr---f
gress was addressing. The Arbitration Act sought to "overcome the rule of equity, that equity will not specifically enforce any arbitration agreement." Hearing on S. 4214
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
67th Cong., 4th Sess. 6 (1923) ("Senate Hearing") (remarks of
Sen. Walsh). The House Report accompanying the bill
stated:
"[t]he need for the law arises from ... the jealousy of
the English courts for their own jurisdiction. . . . This
jealousy survived for so lon[g] a period that the principle
became firmly embedded in the English common law and
was adopted with it by the American courts. The
courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly
fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment .... " H. R. Rep. No. 96, supra, 1-2 (1924).
Surely this makes clear that the House Report contemplated a broad reach of the Act, unencumbered by state law
constraints. Congress also showed its awareness of the
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widespread unwillingness of state courts to enforce arbitration agreements, e. g., Senate Hearing, supra, at 8, and that
such courts were bound by state laws inadequately providing
for
"technical arbitration by which, if you agree to arbitrate
under the method provided by the statute, you have an
arbitration by statute[;] but [the statutes] ha[d] nothing
to do with validating the contract to arbitrate." Ibid.
The problems Congress faced were therefore twofold: the old
common law hostility toward arbitration, and the failure of
state arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of arbitration agreements. To confine the scope of the Act, as is
urged by appellees, would frustrate what we believe Congress intended to be a broad enactment appropriate in scope
to meet the problems Congress was addressing.
Under the interpretation of the Arbitration Act urged by
appellees, claims brought under the California Franchise Investment Law are not arbitrable when they are raised in
state court. Yet it is clear beyond question that if this suit
had been brought as a diversity action in a federal district
court, the arbitration clause would have been enforceable. 7
Prima Paint, supra. The interpretation given to the Arbitration Act by the California Supreme Court would therefore encourage and reward forum shopping. We are unwilling to attribute to Congress the intent, in drawing on the
comprehensive powers of the Commerce Clause, to create a
right to enforce an arbitration contract and yet make the
right dependent for its enforcement on the particular forum
in which it is asserted. And since the overwhelming propor7
Appellees contend that the arbitration clause, which provides for the
arbitration of "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
Agreement or the breach hereof," does not cover their claims under the
California Franchise Investment Law. We find the language quoted
above broad enough to cover such claims. Cf. Prima Paint, supra, 388
U. S., at 403-404, 406 (finding nearly identical language to cover a claim
that a contract was induced by fraud) .
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tion of all civil litigation in this country is in the state courts, 8
we cannot believe Congress intended to limit the Arbitration
Act to disputes subject only to federal court jurisdiction. 9
Appellees' interpretation would frustrate Congressional intent to place "[a]n arbitration agreement ... upon the same
footing as other contracts, where it belongs." H. R. Rep.
No. 96, supra, 1.
In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as
federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration
agreements. 10 We hold that § 31512 of the California Franchise Investment Law violates the Supremacy Clause.
IV
The judgment of the California Supreme Court denying enforcement of the arbitration agreement is reversed; as to the
question whether the Federal Arbitration Act precludes a
8
It is estimated that 2% of all civil litigation in this country is in the
federal courts. Administrative Office of the United States Court, Annual
Report of the Director 3 (1982) (206,000 filings in federal district court in
twelve months ending June 30, 1982, excluding bankruptcy filings);
Flango, Advance Report-The Latest State Court Caseload Data, State
Court Journal, p. 18 (Winter 1983) (approximately 13,600,000 civil filings
during comparable period, excluding traffic filings).
• While the Federal Arbitration Act creates federal substantive law requiring the parties to honor arbitration agreements, it does not create any
independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1976)
or otherwise. Moses H. Cone,-- U. S., at-- n. 32. Section 4 provides for an order compelling arbitration, and § 3 provides for a stay of federal court proceedings, only when the federal district court has jurisdiction
over the underlying dispute. Ibid.
10
The California Supreme Court justified its holding by reference to our
conclusion in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427 (1953), that arbitration agreements are nonbinding as to claims arising under the federal Securities Act
of 1933. 31 Cal. 3d at 602, 645 P. 2d at 1202-1203. The analogy is unpersuasive. The question in Wilko was not whether a state legislature could
create an exception to § 2 of the Arbitration Act, but rather whether Congress, in subsequently enacting the Securities Act, had in fact created such
an exception.

-
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class action arbitration and any other issues not raised in the
California courts, no decision by this Court would be appropriate at this time. As to the latter issues, the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We noted probable jurisdiction to consider (a) whether the
California Franchise Investment Law, which invalidates certain arbitration agreements covered by the Federal Arbitration Act, violates the Supremacy Clause and (b) whether arbitration under the Federal Act is impaired when a class
action structure is imposed on the process by the state
courts.
I

Appellant The Southland Corporation is the owner and
franchisor of 7-Eleven convenience stores. Southland's
standard franchise agreement provides each franchisee with
a license to use certain registered trademarks, a lease or sublease of a convenience store owned or leased by Southland,
inventory financing, and assistance in advertising and merchandising. The franchisees operate the stores, supply
bookkeeping data, and pay Southland a fixed percentage of
gross profits. The franchise agreement also contains the
following provision requiring arbitration:
"Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to
this Agreement or the breach thereof shall be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American
Arbitration Association . . . and judgment upon any
award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any
court having jurisdiction thereof."
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Appellees are 7-Eleven franchisees. Between September
1975 and January 1977, several appellees filed individual actions against Southland in California Superior Court alleging,
among other things, fraud, oral misrepresentation, breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the disclosure requirements of the California Franchise Investment
Law, Cal. Corp. Code §31000 et seq. (West 1977). Southland's answer, in all but one of the individual actions, included the affirmative defense of failure to arbitrate.
In May 1977, appellee Keating filed a class action against
Southland on behalf of a class that assertedly includes approximately 800 California franchisees. Keating's principal
claims were substantially the same as those asserted by the
other franchisees. After the various actions were consolidated, Southland petitioned to compel arbitration of the
claims in all cases, and appellees moved for class certification.
The Superior Court granted Southland's motion to compel
arbitration of all claims except those claims based on the
Franchise Investment Law. The court did not pass on appellees' request for class certification. Southland appealed
from tlie order insofar as it excluded from arbitration the
claims based on the California statute. Appellees filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition in the California
Court of Appeal arguing that the arbitration should proceed
as a class action.
The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's
refusal to compel arbitration of appellees' claims under the
Franchise Investment Law. 167 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1980).
That court interpreted the arbitration clause to require arbitration of all claims asserted under the Franchise Investment Law, and construed the Franchise Investment Law not
to invalidate such agreements to arbitrate. 1 Alternatively,
the court concluded that if the Franchise Investment Law
Cal. Corp. Code § 31512 provides: "Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void."
1

-
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rendered arbitration agreements involving commerce unenforceable, it would conflict with § 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U. S. C. §2 (1976), and therefore be invalid under the
Supremacy Clause. 167 Cal. Rptr. at 493-494. The Court
of Appeal also determined that there was no "insurmountable
obstacle" to conducting an arbitration on a classwide basis,
and issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to conduct class certification proceedings. I d., at 492.
The California Supreme Court, by a vote of 4-2, reversed
the ruling that claims asserted under the Franchise Investment Law are arbitrable. 31 Cal. 3d 584, 645 P. 2d 1192
(1982). The California Supreme Court interpreted the Franchise Investment Law to require judicial consideration of
claims brought under that statute and concluded that the
California statute did not contravene the federal Act. I d., at
604, 645 P. 2d, 1203-1204. The court also remanded the case
to the trial court for consideration of appellees' request for
classwide arbitration.
We noted probable jurisdiction, - - U. S. - - (1982).
We reverse in part and dismiss in part.
II
A

Jurisdiction of this Court is asserted under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1257(2) which provides for an appeal from a final judgment
of the highest court of a state when the validity of a challenged state statute is sustained as not in conflict with federal
law. Here Southland challenged the California Franchise
Investment Law as it was applied to invalidate a contract for
arbitration made pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act.
Appellee argues that the action of the California Supreme
Court with respect to this claim is not a "final judgment or
decree" within the meaning of § 1257(2).
Under Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469,
482--483 (1975), judgments of state courts that finally decide a
federal issue are immediately appealable when "the party
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seeking review here might prevail [in the state court] on the
merits on nonfederal grounds, thus rendering unnecessary
review of the federal issue by this Court, and where reversal
of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of
any further litigation on the relevant cause of action.... "
In these circumstances, we have resolved the federal issue "if
a refusal immediately to review the state-court decision
might seriously erode federal policy." ld., at 483.
The judgment of the California Supreme Court with respect to this claim is reviewable under Cox Broadcasting,
supra. Without immediate review of the California holding
by this Court there may be no opportunity to pass on the federal issue and as a result "there would remain in effect the
unreviewed decision of the State Supreme Court" holding
that the California statute does not confict the Federal Arbitration Act. I d., at 485. On the other hand, reversal of a
state court judgment in this setting will terminate litigation
of the merits of this dispute.
Finally, the failure to accord immediate review of the decision of the California Supreme Court might "seriously erode
federal policy." Plainly the effect of the judgment of the
California court is to nullify a valid contract made by private
parties under which they agreed to submit all contract disputes to final, binding arbitration. The federal Act permits
"parties to an arbitrable dispute [to move] out of court and
into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible." Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,
- u. s. - , - (1983).
Contracts to arbitrate are not to be avoided by allowing
one party to ignore the contract and resort to the courts.
Such a course could lead to prolonged litigation, one of the
very risks the parties, by contracting for arbitration, sought
to eliminate. In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U. S. 1, 12 (1972), we noted that the contract fixing a particular forum for resolution of all disputes
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"was made in an arm's-length negotiation by experienced
and sophisticated businessmen, and absent some compelling and countervailing reason it should be honored by
the parties and enforced by the courts."
The Zapata court also noted that
"the forum clause was a vital part of the agreement, and
it would be unrealistic to think that the parties did not
conduct their negotiations, including fixing the monetary
terms, with the consequences of the forum clause figuring prominently in their calculations." ld., at 14.
For us to delay review of a state judicial decision denying
enforcement of the contract to arbitrate until the state court
litigation has run its course would defeat the core purpose of
a contract to arbitrate. We hold that the Court has jurisdiction to decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts
§ 31512 of the California Franchise Investment Law.
B

That part of the appeal relating to the propriety of superimposing class action procedures on a contract arbitration
raises other questions. Southland did not contend in the
California courts that, and the State courts did not decide
whether, State law imposition class action procedures was
preempted by federal law. When the California Court of
Appeal directed Southland to address the question whether
state or federal law controlled the class action issue, Southland responded that State law did not permit arbitrations to
proceed as class actions, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were inapplicable, and that requiring arbitrations to
proceed as class actions "could well violate the [federal] constitutional guaranty of procedural due process." 2 Southland
did not claim in the Court of Appeal that if State law required
2

Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
Petition for Writs of Mandate or Prohibition at 19--25.
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class action procedures, it would conflict with the federal Act
and thus violate the Supremacy Clause.
In the California Supreme Court, Southland argued that
California law applied but that neither the contract to arbitrate nor State law authorized class action procedures to govern arbitrations. Southland also contended that the Federal
Rules were inapplicable in State proceedings. Southland
pointed out that although California law provided a basis for
class action procedures, the Judicial Council of California acknowledged "the incompatibility of class actions and arbitration." Petition for Hearing at 23. It does not appear that
Southland opposed class procedures onfederal grounds in the
California Supreme Court. 3 Nor does the record show that
the California Supreme Court passed upon the question
whether superimposing class action procedures on a contract
arbitration was contrary to the federal Act. 4
3

The question Southland presented to the state Supreme Court was
"[w ]hether a court may enter an order compelling a private commercial arbitration governed by the Federal Arbitration Act ... to proceed as a class
action even though the terms of the parties' arbitration agreement do not
provide for such a procedure." Southland argued that (1) the decision of
the Court of Appeal "is in conflict with the decisions of other Courts of Appeal in this State," Petition for Hearing at 3; (2) class actions would delay
and complicate arbitration, increase its cost, and require judicial supervision, "considerations [which] strongly militate against the creation of class
action arbitration procedures," id., at 22; and (3) there was no basis in law
for class actions. According to appellants, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not apply in California courts. I d., at 23. Southland thus relied, not on federal law, but on California law in opposing class action
procedures.
'The California Supreme Court cited "[a]nalogous authority'' supporting consolidation of arbitration proceedings by federal courts. E. g.,
Compania Espanola de Petrolowos, S. A . v. Nereus Shipping, S . A., 527
F. 2d 966, 975 (CA2 1975), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 936 (1976); In re
Czarnikow-Rionda Co., 512 F. Supp. 1308, 1309 (SDNY 1981). This,
along with support by other state courts and the California legislature for
consolidation of arbitration proceedings permitted the court to conclude
that class action proceedings were authorized: "It is unlikely that the state
Legislature in adopting the amendment to the Arbitration Act authorizing
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Since it does not affirmatively appear that the validity of
the State statute was "drawn in question" on federal grounds
by Southland, this Court is without jurisdiction to resolve
this question as a matter of federal law under 28 U. S. C.
§ 1257(2). See Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U. S. 203, 207
(1945).
III
The California Franchise Investment Law provides:
"Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to
bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or order
hereunder is void." Cal. Corp. Code § 31512 (West
1977).
The California Supreme Court interpreted this statute to require judicial consideration of claims brought under the State
statute and accordingly refused to enforce the parties' contract to arbitrate such claims. So interpreted the California
Franchise Investment Law directly conflicts with § 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act and violates the Supremacy Clause.
In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared anational policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of
the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act provides:
"A written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arisconsolidation of arbitration proceedings, intended to preclude a court from
ordering classwide arbitration in an appropriate case. We conclude that a
court is not without authority to do so." 31 Cal. 3d, at 613, 645 P. 2d, at
1209. The California Supreme Court thus ruled that imposing a class action structure on the arbitration process was permissible as a matter of
state law.
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ing out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract." 9 U. S. C. § 2 (1976).
Congress has thus mandated the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.
We discern only two limitations on the enforceability of arbitration provisions governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act: they must be part of a written maritime contract or a
contract "evidencing a transaction involving commerce" 6 and
such clauses may be revoked upon "grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract." We see nothing in the Act indicating that the broad principle of enforceability is subject to any additional limitations under State
law.
The Federal Arbitration Act rests on the authority of· Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause.
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Corp., 388 U. S. 395 (1967), the Court examined the legislative history of the Act and concluded that the statute "is
based upon . . . the incontestable federal foundations of 'control over interstate commerce and over admiralty."' I d., at
405 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1924)). The contract in Prima Paint, as here, contained an
arbitration clause. One party in that case alleged that the
other had committed fraud in the inducement of the contract,
~~- althou~arbitration clause in particular, and sought to
have the claim of fraud adjudicated in federal court. The
Court held that, notwithstanding a contrary state rule, consideration of a claim of fraud in the inducement of a contract
"is for the arbitrators and not for the courts," id., at 400.
' We note that in defining "commerce" Congress declared that "nothing
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class or workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U. S. C. § 1 (1976).
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The Court relied for this holding on Congress' broad power to
fashion substantive rules under the Commerce Clause. 6
At least since 1824 Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause has been held plenary. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9
Wheat. 1, 196 (1824). In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, the authority of Congress is "the power to regulate;
that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed." Ibid. The statements of the Court in Prima Paint
that the Arbitration Act was an exercise of the Commerce
Clause power clearly implied that the substantive rules of the
Act were to apply in state as well as federal courts. As Justice Black observed in his dissent, when Congress exercises
its authority to enact substantive federal law under the Commerce Clause, it normally creates rules that are enforceable
in state as well as federal courts. Prima Paint, 388 U. S.,
at 420 (Black, J., dissenting).
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., - - U. S., at - - , - - n. 32, we reaffirmed our view that the Arbitration Act "creates a body of
federal substantive law" and expressly stated what was implicit in Prima Paint, i. e., the substantive law the Act created was applicable in state and federal court. Moses H.
Cone began with a petition for an order to compel arbitration.
The District Court stayed the action pending resolution of a
concurrent state court suit. In holding that that the District
Court had abused its discretion, we found no showing of exceptional circumstances justifying the stay and recognized
"the presence of federal-law issues" under the federal Act as
"a major consideration weighing against surrender [of federal
jurisdiction]." Id., at--. We thus read the underlying
issue of arbitrability to be a question of substantive federal
6

The procedures to be used in an arbitration are not prescribed by the
federal Act. We note, however, that Prima Paint, supra, considered the
question of what issues are for the courts and what issues are for the
arbitrator.

82-500-0PINION
10

SOUTHLAND CORP. v. KEATING

law: "Federal law in the terms of the Arbitration Act governs
that issue in either state or federal court." I d., at--.
Alth.ough the legislative history is not without ambiguities,
there are strong indications that Congress had in mind something more than making arbitration agreements enforceable
only in the federal courts. The House Report plainly suggests the more comprehensive objectives:
"The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforcible
agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or admiralty, or which may be the subject of litigation in the
Federal courts." H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1924) (Emphasis added.)

J

This broader purpose can also be inferred from the reality
that Congress would be less likely to address a problem
whose impact was confined to federal courts than a problem
of large significance in the field of commerce, pt:oblem Co11---P
gress was addressiHg. ' The Arbitration Act sought to "overcome the rule of equity, that equity will not specifically enforce any arbitration agreement." Hearing on S. 4214
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
67th Cong., 4th Sess. 6 (1923) ("Senate Hearing") (remarks of
Sen. Walsh). The House Report accompanying the bill
stated:
"[t]he need for the law arises from ... the jealousy of
the English courts for their own jurisdiction. . . . This
jealousy survived for so lon[g] a period that the principle
became firmly embedded in the English common law and
was adopted with it by the American courts. The
courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly
fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment .... " H. R. Rep. No. 96, supra, 1-2 (1924).
Surely this makes clear that the House Report contemplated a broad reach of the Act, unencumbered by state law
constraints. Congress also showed its awareness of the
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widespread unwillingness of state courts to enforce arbitration agreements, e. g., Senate Hearing, supra, at 8, and that
such courts were bound by state laws inadequately providing
for
"technical arbitration by which, if you agree to arbitrate
under the method provided by the statute, you have an
arbitration by statute[;] but [the statutes] ha[d] nothing
to do with validating the contract to arbitrate." Ibid.
The problems Congress faced were therefore twofold: the old
common law hostility toward arbitration, and the failure of
state arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of arbitration agreements. To confine the scope of the Act, as is
urged by appellees, would frustrate what we believe Congress intended to be a broad enactment appropriate in scope
to meet the problems Congress was addressing.
Under the interpretation of the Arbitration Act urged by
appellees, claims brought under the California Franchise Investment Law are not arbitrable when they are raised in
state court. Yet it is clear beyond question that if this suit
had been brought as a diversity action in a federal district
court, the arbitration clause would have been enforceable. 7
Prima Paint, supra. The interpretation given to the Arbitration Act by the California Supreme Court would therefore encourage and reward forum shopping. We are unwilling to attribute to Congress the intent, in drawing on the
comprehensive powers of the Commerce Clause, to create a
right to enforce an arbitration contract and yet make the
right dependent for its enforcement on the particular forum
in which it is asserted. And since the overwhelming propor' Appellees contend that the arbitration clause, which provides for the
arbitration of "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
Agreement or the breach hereof," does not cover their claims under the
California Franchise Investment Law. We find the language quoted
above broad enough to cover such claims. Cf. Prima Paint, supra, 388
U. S., at 403--404, 406 (finding nearly identical language to cover a claim
that a contract was induced by fraud).
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tion of all civil litigation in this country is in the state courts, 8
we cannot believe Congress intended to limit the Arbitration
Act to disputes subject only to federal court jurisdiction. 9
Appellees' interpretation would frustrate Congressional intent to place "[a]n arbitration agreement ... upon the same
footing as other contracts, where it belongs." H. R. Rep.
No. 96, supra, 1.
In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as
federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration
agreements. 10 We hold that § 31512 of the California Franchise Investment Law violates the Supremacy Clause.
IV
The judgment of the California Supreme Court denying enforcement of the arbitration agreement is reversed; as to the
question whether the Federal Arbitration Act precludes a

-

8
It is estimated that 2% of all civil litigation in this country is in the
federal courts. Administrative Office of the United States Court, Annual
Report of the Director 3 (1982) (206,000 filings in federal district court in
twelve months ending June 30, 1982, excluding bankruptcy filings);
Flango, Advance Report-The Latest State Court Caseload Data, State
Court Journal, p. 18 (Winter 1983) (approximately 13,600,000 civil filings
during comparable period, excluding traffic filings).
9
While the Federal Arbitration Act creates federal substantive law requiring the parties to honor arbitration agreements, it does not create any
independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1976)
or otherwise. Moses H. Cone,-- U. S., at-- n. 32. Section 4 provides for an order compelling arbitration, and § 3 provides for a stay of federal court proceedings, only when the federal district court has jurisdiction
over the underlying dispute. Ibid.
10
The California Supreme Court justified its holding by reference to our
conclusion in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427 (1953), that arbitration agreements are nonbinding as to claims arising under the federal Securities Act
of 1933. 31 Cal. 3d at 602, 645 P. 2d at 1202--1203. The analogy is unpersuasive. The question in Wilko was not whether a state legislature could
create an exception to § 2 of the Arbitration Act, but rather whether Congress, in subsequently enacting the Securities Act, had in fact created such
an exception.
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class action arbitration and any other issues not raised in the
California courts, no decision by this Court would be appropriate at this time. As to the latter issues, the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
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